INTRODUCTION institutions is limited by the ECCB AgreeIn this paper we present a discussion on the ment Act 1983. The number of governneed for deposit insurance, within the conments involved in the currency union text of the Eastern Caribbean Currency ensures a certain amount of autonomy for : Union (ECCU). Whether or not a country the ECCB. Further, the inability of any should adopt deposit insurance to protect individual government to monetise their the financial system from bank failures is a debt is a constraint that forces governments seriously debated and thoroughly to practise fiscal discipline. researched issue. We therefore confine our
The ECCU, however, has virtually no Journal of Financial Regulation economy has managed to grow with relaDeposit insurance protects small depositively unsophisticated consumers of finantors, for whom it is not cost effective to cial services.
obtain sufficient information about the Essentially, we argue that improvements condition of a bank. This is especially benin technology, freer trade, liberalisation of eficial from a social point of view, where our own environment, increased alternathe loss of savings would result in a fall in tives and increasing financial sophistication consumption for a vast cross-section of the of our consumers all increase macroecosociety. nomic risks and risks of systemic failure. It
In the presence of deposit insurance, is against this backdrop that we consider the depositors are more likely to retain a larger I costs and the benefits of deposit insurance in proportion of their financial resources the region. We weigh this consideration within the banking system as they are with the costs and benefits of strengthening likely to have greater confidence in the the regulatory framework in the region.
safety of their assets. This reduces the cost of resource mobilisation for depositary ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST institutions and hence the cost of borrow-DEPOSIT INSURANCE ing. This, one would expect, would have The discussion on whether or not any an expansionary effect on savings and financial system needs deposit insurance investment, leading to improved growth hinges on the fact that most financial sysperformance. Moreover, since savings tems have inherited a system of fractional (deposit) act as a store of value and a reserve banking which is an inherently framethod of deferred payment, deposit gile and potentially unstabl~ system of insurance also protects the payment system financial intermediation. One of the basic and prevents reversion to a cash system. characteristics of fractional reserve banking Deposit insurance schemes promote arises from a perceived externality. For competitive efficiency. They do this by instance, a single bank failure that involves enabling small, 'local', and newly establosses to depositors may cause other deposilished banks to compete with depositary tors to panic and withdraw their funds institutions that benefit from the 'too big from other banks. If enough depositors to fail' implicit guarantee. In the absence of demand their funds from banks, even the deposit insurance the failure of large instimost conservative bank will not be able to tutions may be perceived to have such a meet its obligations. The failure of one substantial impact on the economy that the bank by way of contagion effects on other government would bail them out. In the banks can, have serious disruptive consecase of developing countries, the head quences for the whole financial system. In offices of foreign banks may step in to this section we summarise the major benerescue them in order to save their reputafits and costs of deposit insurance.
tion. Agents therefore react by concentrating their deposits in the institutions that The benefits have the implicit guarantee, thus leaving Deposit insurance reduces the chance of a small banks at a considerable disadvantage bank panic and the attendant contagion and effectively being a barrier to entry to effects that a run on one bank can impose new banks. on the entire banking system. It contributes
In the event of a bank failure, explicit to financial stabilisation by encouraging limited deposit coverage reduces the outlay confidence in the financial system and by of a government or central bank relative to isolating the effects of single bank failure.
an implicit guarantee 'bailout'. The cost burden is shifted to the beneficiaries and money with riskier banks that offer a members of the deposit insurance, as higher return. This in itself is destabilising. opposed to the situation that obtains with Likewise, the management of the banks are implicit guarantees from governments or more likely to take on additional risks and central banks.
this incentive becomes stronger the closer a Finally, deposit insurance serves as a bank gets to insolvency since risky behacomplementary policy instrument to the viour will reap benefits but, in the event of lender of last resort function of the central adverse circumstances, they will not share bank, while providing a formal rules-based the cost. methodology for resolving bank crises. It thereby reduces high resolution costs that STRUCTURE OF THE ECCB FINANCIAL I are often associated with regulatory discre-SYSTEM : tion. Rules provide equity and fairness, but
The financial system of the countries they also often translate into improved regwithin the ECCB area is not very sophistiulatory and supervisory legislation. cated in terms of the range of financial institutions and financial instruments. The The costs financial institutions in existence as at There are two major costs associated with December 1998 are the Eastern Caribbean deposit insurance and they arise because of Central Bank, commercial banks, developthe existence of information asymmetries. ment banks, insurance companies, credit These are adverse selection and moral unions, offshore banks, national develophazard. Adverse selection occurs when the ment foundations and the Eastern Caribagents who are most likely to produce the bean Home Mortgage Bank. As at adverse outcome insured against are those December 1994, there were 368 financial most likely to take advantage of the insurinstitutions in the system. Insurance agenance policy. Moral hazard refers to the cies accounted for about half (152) the total incentive the insured have to take on addinumber of institutions in the system and tional risks that may result in an insurance they are well spread across the islands.2 payoff. Adverse selection occurs when Insurance companies, however, only deposit insurance is voluntary and preaccounted for about 4.6 per cent of the miums are not risk adjusted (flat). Consertotal assets of the financial system as at vative banks will leave or not opt to take December 1995. The insurance market is insurance. This will leave only weak banks dominated by agencies of companies incorcovered by deposit insurance and may raise porated in other CARl COM countries and premiums even further causing aflother in the metropolitan centres. cohort of banks to leave. This leaves Credit unions and commercial banks are behind very high risk banks, the ones most the next largest groups in terms of the susceptible to failure.
number of financial institutions. CommerMoral hazard is a major concern of cial banks hold the largest share of assets in deposit insurance arrangements. The the financial system accounting for about greater the coverage of deposit insurance, 64 per cent of total assets in 1995. They the greater the moral hazard. The lower therefore dominate the financial sector in the coverage, the higher is market disciterms of credit creation and savings mobilipline. Depositors who know that their sation. Credit unions are important nondeposits are protected have no incentive to bank financial institutions that were estabmonitor the soundness of the banks and, Ii shed to provide credit to certain sections indeed, are more likely to place their of the population. ably well for the region in the past. Under The ECCB has assumed the responsibilthe fixed exchange rate regime the EC ity of developing the financial system. It dollar has maintained parity with the US was thus instrumental in the establishment dollar from 1976. The region has therefore of the Eastern Caribbean Home Mortgage been characterised by low inflation and Bank in 1995. The ECCB has also adopted financial and macroeconomic stability. The .. a facilitatory approach to the development region is, however, highly susceptible to of the money and capital markets. Plans external shocks as the main revenue-generfor money and capital market development ating activities, agriculture and tourism, are ~:.;il", "!l~ ~[o;ii:.!j"
highly dependent on weather conditions sation has increased the probability of and international commodity prices. In macroeconomic shocks, thus posing greater addition, the region is now faced with the pressure on the payment and financial sysuncertainty of preferential access for banaterns. Technological advances will soon nas, the subject of much debate between make it easier for cross-border trading. the World Trade Organisation and the This means that individuals within the European Union.
ECCB jurisdictions will have the option of Until the mid 1980s there were not making financial transactions in other jurismany significant changes in the structure of dictions while non-residents of the ECCB the financial system and the operational area will also have the option of crossframework of the ECCB. Thus, the present border financial trade with financial instituoperational framework was not presented tions in the ECCB area. These developwith a significant number of challenges, ments are also likely to increase the such as increased exposure and high levels potential for increased exposure and sysof risk. The 1990s have been characterised temic risk. by development of the financial system.
Deposit insurance improves individuals' These developments include the ECCB's confidence in the sY.stem and therefore initiatives in the development of the ensures that a certain amount of savings money and capital markets. Other agents stay within the jurisdiction. It can be in the financial sector have also taken argued that commercial bankers can pass initiatives related to the deepening of the the cost of deposit insurance on to the financial system. These include the formadepositor through increased lending costs. tion of groups of financial institutions and With the development of our financial the expansion of offshore banking affiliates.
markets, and globalisation of the world It is not certain what effect these changes economy, however, Caribbean depositors will have on the financial system and the are likely to have alternative avenues for operational framework of the ECCB as the investment. The presence of deposit insurregion does not have much experience in ance encourages depositors to keep their this area. It has been argued, however, that savings within the banking system resulting as the financial system deepens, risk expoin a reduction in the cost of resource mobisure and the possibility of contagion lisation. In an effort to remain competitive increases.3 For instance, financial innovacommercial banks will have a strong incentions such as the formation of groups are tive to reduce the cost of borrowing. This likely to expose agents to greater risk. This implies that deposit insurance may have is because the problems of a failing instituexpansionary effects on both savings and tion within a group can adversely affect investment and, ultimately economic other members of the group through debt growth. and lending policies such as concentrated Perhaps the strongest argument against and connected lending. Thus, it is impordeposit insurance is the moral hazard probtant that the likely effects of financial deelem. As was mentioned earlier, the intropening on the financial system and the duction of deposit insurance can, through ECCB operational framework be taken the rational behaviour of financial agents, into consideration when tinkering with the lead to perverse outcomes. The question present system. really is what is the magnitude of the There is also a movement towards the moral hazard problem without deposit integration of the markets in the OECS insurance. This we would have to compare into a single financial space. deposit insurance system. This amounts to fact that the markets within the region are comparing the factual with the counterfacfragmented. This suggests that contagion tual, which is extremely difficult. The would be constrained or restricted to a parsystem as it currently operates in the ticular island, so that banking sector prob-ECCB area, functions with an implicit lems in one country would be isolated and guarantee. For political reasons governthe resolution costs might actually be less ments are likely to guarantee the national than with a deposit insurance scheme.4 The banks in the region, and foreign banks are intervention of the Bank of Montserrat by likely to draw on reserves from their head the Central Bank in 1993 supports this offices to alleviate liquidity problems. In argument, as the liquidity problems of that situations where the implicit guarantee bank were restricted to Montserrat. In offers depositors 100 per cent coverage addition, some of the foreign banks bring market discipline will be minimal. Deposit some stability to the system, as they are insurance with less than 100 per cent coverable to draw on the reserves of their head age could actually impose market discipline offices during periods of illiquidity. Foreign in the ECCB financial area and reduce branch banks are also protected by virtue moral hazard. Th\s will only occur if of the fact that the parent banks belong to depositors perceive the coverage to be less deposit insurance schemes. than 100 per cent, thus improving the The above arguments fail to recognise c credibility of the scheme. that the region is moving towards the for-
It has been argued that improved disclo-mation of a single financial space where , sure may impose market discipline on markets are integrated and the probability commercial banks and other financial instiof contagion across the jurisdiction tutions. Because small depositors within increases. Further, the multi-island nature this jurisdiction are unsophisticated it is, of the jurisdiction assists in the diversificahowever, unlikely that improved disclosure tion of risk under the deposit insurance will impose any significant form of discischeme. For instance, commercial banks in pline on financial institutions. In this way St Lucia may be negatively affected by a deposit insurance may be more effective in banana shock. Commercial banks in Anti-I protecting depositors from bank failures. gua may not, however, be affected by the !.
Limited deposit insurance coverage and shock.
improved disclosure can assist in imposing The lender of last resort function of the market discipline before a bank failure.
ECCB is constrained by the foreign asset i i. These measures may, however, have destarule. The ECCB is required by law to hold bilising effe<;ts on the financial system. at least 60 per cent of its demand liabilities ! Where it is rumoured that a bank is likely in the form of reserves. This means that to fail, large depositors who are not covthe ECCB can only lend 40 per cent of ered under the deposit insurance scheme demand liabilities to governments and have an incentive to withdraw their funds financial institutions. In practice, the from the banking system, thus increasing ECCB maintains a foreign exchange cover the possibility of systemic failure.
of about 98 per cent of demand liabilities, Yet another argument against deposit which implies that the lender of last resort insurance in the ECCB area is that the function is marginal. multi-island nature of the jurisdiction
The lender of last resort function of the reduces the probability of contagion, so ECCB is further constrained by s.40(1) of that systemic failure in the region is unlithe ECCB Agreement Act 1983, which kely. This argument is supported by the states that the ECCB can purchase publicly issued government securities to the extent demands. We do not anticipate a problem, of 15 per cent of currency in circulation however, because a deposit insurance and other demand liabilities.s Further, the scheme can function effectively with bor-ECCB may make temporary advances to rowing limits, and can outsource funds, and purchase treasury bills from participatonce the central bank will guarantee the ing governments according to certain fiscal loans. The money can be repaid in the criteria.6 The development of the governusual way by levying fees on financial ment securities market in the region is institutions and governments, after the likely to increase the amount of governcrisis has occurred.7 ment debt purchased by the ECCB as cur-
The need for deposit insurance is made rently the stipulated limits are even more critical when we consider the underutilised. This limits the amount of strength of the regulatory framework of funds that the ECCB can lend to financial the ECCB area. First, the scope of the institutions through its discount window.
ECCB supervision is limited to the comIn situations where the ECCB may have to mercial banking sector, which leaves other lend significantly to commercial banks and depositary institutions such as credit has to reduce its reserve cover there is unions, insurance companies, development uncertainty regarding the extent to which banks and savings and loan firms underit can be reduced. This is because it is not supervised. While the ECCB monitors known at what point the erosion of confidevelopments within the non-bank finandence in the value of the currency will cial sector, the participating governments occur, resulting in capital flight and the are the official regulators of this sector. In threat of devaluation. most instances, governments are not The above arguments suggest that the equipped with the financial resources and current framework is not adequate in terms technical competence to effectively moniof dealing with systemic crisis. This really tor the non-bank sector. This situation has stems from the inability of the ECCB to resulted in the underregulation of the noncreate systemic liquidity through open bank financial sector. With regards to the market operations and the discount supervision of commercial banks the legiswindow. This suggests that there is a need lative power of the ECCB is restricted as for some mechanism to augment the existthe governments retain the power to ing framework. Deposit insurance is a license, foreclose and liquidate. Moral suaplausible instrument if it is properly sion is the main tool used to ensure that designed to suit the needs of the ECCB commercial banks comply with regulatory area. A compulsory deposit insurance standards. This implies that the ECCB scheme would complement and augment cannot force commercial banks to comply the regulatory and supervisory functions of and therefore constrains its ability to prethe ECCB. It would substantially enhance vent bank failures. the ability of the central bank to prevent a crisis and, in the event that one takes place, CONCLUSION AND POLICY OPTIONS to manage that c~isis effectively and effiThe paper has argued that, with careful ciently. The rules would have already been implementation and design, deposit insurlaid down and the powers of the ECCB ance can confer significant benefits on the enhanced. There may be a problem if, as is ECCB area. Experience has indicated, howusually the case, the deposit insurance instiever, that the moral hazard problem does tution is permitted to borrow extensively increase after the implementation of a from the ECCB to meet short-term deposit insurance scheme.8 It has also been~:
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.ii':l !j::l.';;:Ii1:;;:':!jii:,j,ri:,j,iiic", =::l~iiC",.i":~~.i~i1~",~":~'.i'C",..~.~~J~:a~':II:;; of a deposit insurance scheme that will suit This option will reduce regulatory costs the needs of the region. and also address inconsistencies in various pieces of legislation in the various countries. Within the context of a liberalised
